What drives special district dissolution in the areas of fire protection, housing and community development, natural resources, and water supply?

Motivation

  • Special districts dissolve often
    • Approximately 6% of special districts, in any functional area, were dissolved in any 5-year block between 1977 and 2012
  • Special districts are highly specialized
    • Some functional areas are dynamic, and others are relatively static
    • Previous work suggests analyzing all types of special district function together is inappropriate (Foster 1997)
  • Little to no research on special district dissolution
    • Exceptions: Bauroth (2010), Moldogaziev, Scott, and Greer (2019), Goodman and Leland (2024)

Motivations

  • Two approaches to examining dissolutions
    • Individual level analyses
    • Systems level analyses
  • Potentially important factors
    • An area’s prior experience with local government reorganization (obsolescence)
    • Local demand for services
    • State limitations on general purpose local governments
    • Boundary change entrepreneurs

Empirical Model

  • Time period: 1977-2017
  • Unit of analysis: all and metropolitan counties
  • Four largest functional areas
    • Fire Protection; Housing and Community Development; Natural Resources; Water Services
  • Data sources:
    • Census of Governments
    • Census Bureau
    • Bureau of Economic Analysis
    • CDC

Coverage

Year Total Districts Total Fire Protection Housing and Community Development Natural Resources Water Supply
1977 11,911 48.78% 17.31% 9.16% 11.69% 10.62%
1982 13,075 48.73% 17.34% 10.40% 10.42% 10.57%
1987 13,613 49.12% 17.85% 10.60% 10.32% 10.35%
1992 14,615 46.71% 17.00% 9.74% 9.72% 10.24%
1997 15,561 44.35% 16.70% 8.84% 9.24% 9.58%
2002 15,640 44.12% 16.94% 8.61% 9.20% 9.37%
2007 16,449 42.03% 15.89% 8.16% 9.02% 8.96%
2012 17,209 40.18% 15.11% 7.69% 8.87% 8.51%
2017 17,524 39.57% 15.10% 7.46% 8.61% 8.40%

Model Specification

\[ XR_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta ER_{ijt-1} + \gamma X_{it} + \delta I_{it} + \rho E_{it} + \phi_i + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{ijt} \]

  • where,
    • \(ER_{ijt-1}\) is the special district entry rate in the previous period for the same functional area
    • \(X\) is a vector of service demand related variables
    • \(I\) is a vector of state limitation on local governments
    • \(E\) is a vector of variables related to the presence of boundary change entrepreneurs
    • \(\phi_i\) is county fixed effects, \(\tau_t\) is time fixed effects, and \(\varepsilon\) is the usual composite error term

Entry & Exit

Exit Rate

\[ XR_{it-1}=\frac{NX_{it-1}}{NT_{it-1}} \]

Entry Rate

\[ ER_{it}=\frac{NE_{it}}{NT_{it-1}} \]

  • \(NX_{it-1}\) is the number of special districts that dissolved in the previous period
  • \(NE_{it}\) is the number of new special districts in the current period
  • \(NT_{it-1}\) is the total number of special districts in the previous period “at risk”

Independent Variables

  • Entry rate (by function) in previous period
  • Municipal TEL
  • County TEL
  • Municipal debt limit
  • County debt limit
  • Municipal functional home rule
  • County functional home rule
  • Location quotient (4 infrastructure/real estate related industries)
  • Personal Income
  • Population (level, growth, density)
  • Employment
  • Age/Racial variation
  • Change in the number of cities
  • Usage of Towns

Methodology

  • Two way (county and year) fixed effects regression
  • Cluster SE on state