Are Conservative Cities Smaller in Functional Breadth?

Motivations

We expect the policy preferences of an area to be reflected in the policies adopted by their government

• Broad support in the political science literature that this happens at the federal and state levels

Does this translation hold for local governments?

• A general assumption that there is no political way to deliver local public services
• Institutional innovations to limit political interference (city managers)

Motivations

Prior research suggests (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014) that cities with more conservative policy preferences

• Spend less
• Raise less tax revenue
• Rely on the sales tax more heavily

This analysis examines the first point in more detail. What is the source of lower spending?

• Less intensity of service provision?
• Fewer services provided?

Sample Construction

Period: 2010 (+/-)

Unit: City

• \(N = 1,230\) cities

Data: Appendix

• Census of Governments
• Policy conservatism (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014)
• American Community Survey

Measuring Functional Breadth

Estimation Strategy

\(X_i\) is a vector of variables that control for

• the size of the city
• the wealth of the city
• the racial composition of the city
• the age of the city

Descriptive Statistics

Preliminary Findings

Extensions

What about elected mayors or city managers?

Discussion

• Conservative cities are smaller in functional breadth

  • This is largely driven by fewer functions provided
  • Approximately 0.85 to 1.25 fewer functions provided

• Elected mayors eliminate or reduce this effect, suggesting electoral incentives to “do something” may reduce responsiveness

Next steps

• Explore additional institutional factors that could limit responsiveness

  • Partisan council elections, districting, referendum requirements, etc.

• Look at only commonly provided services to eliminate the possibility of small or uncommon services driving the results