Are Conservative Cities Smaller in Functional Breadth?

Christopher B. Goodman
cgoodman@niu.edu

Northern Illinois University

October 23, 2023

Are cities with residents that hold more ideologically conservative policy positions smaller in functional breadth?

Do these cities provide fewer services?

Motivations

We expect the policy preferences of an area to be reflected in the policies adopted by their government

  • Broad support in the political science literature that this happens at the federal and state levels

Does this translation hold for local governments?

  • A general assumption that there is no political way to deliver local public services
  • Institutional innovations to limit political interference (city managers)

Motivations

Prior research suggests (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014) that cities with more conservative policy preferences

  • Spend less
  • Raise less tax revenue
  • Rely on the sales tax more heavily

This analysis examines the first point in more detail. What is the source of lower spending?

  • Less intensity of service provision?
  • Fewer services provided?

Sample Construction

Period: 2010 (+/-)

Unit: City

  • \(N = 1,230\) cities

Data: Appendix

Measuring Functional Breadth

Functional Performance Index

\[ FP_i = \sum_{n=1}^k f_k \times \frac{E_{jk}}{N_j} \]

where \(f_{k}\) is an indicator \([0, 1]\) that municipality \(i\) provides service \(k\). For each service \(k\) a municipality provides, it is weighted by the sample per capita expenditure in category \(k\).

Functional Inclusiveness or Scope

\[ F_i = \sum_{n=1}^k f_{k} \]

where \(f_k\) is an indicator \([0, 1]\) that municipality \(i\) provides service \(k\)

Estimation Strategy

Regression Specification

The main specification is as follows:

\[ \text{Functional Breadth}_i = \alpha + \text{Citizen Ideology}_i \delta + X_i \beta + \gamma_i + \varepsilon_i \]

\(X_i\) is a vector of variables that control for

  • the size of the city
  • the wealth of the city
  • the racial composition of the city
  • the age of the city

Descriptive Statistics

Mean SD Min Max
Functional performance index 1668.03 593.81 814.84 3944.33
Functions 15.73 3.01 6.00 28.00
Policy conservatism -0.06 0.26 -1.02 0.65
Population (1000s) 108.08 301.52 25.02 8175.13
Median household income 58261.06 21214.02 21739.15 159918.04
Median house price 276312.12 190728.91 55238.29 1066377.29
100 - percent white 31.03 18.37 3.53 99.11
Municipal age 118.15 55.22 2.00 380.00

Preliminary Findings

Functional Performance Index Functions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Policy conservatism -303.107*** -158.846* -2.797*** -1.374***
(63.714) (68.453) (0.234) (0.296)
Population (1000s) 0.290*** 0.002***
(0.057) (0.000)
Median household income -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
Median house price 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
100 - percent white -0.022 -0.004
(0.878) (0.004)
Municipality age 2.078* 0.034***
(0.859) (0.005)
Municipality age squared -0.004+ 0.000***
(0.002) (0.000)
N 1241 1232 1241 1232
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by: State by: State by: State by: State
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Extensions

What about elected mayors or city managers?

Functional Performance Index Functions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Policy conservatism -303.107*** -142.059 -2.797*** -1.060*
(63.714) (104.176) (0.234) (0.440)
Elected mayor (=1) 6.027 0.160
(28.731) (0.129)
Policy conservatism x elected mayor -21.249 -0.607
(136.474) (0.472)
N 1241 1215 1241 1215
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by: State by: State by: State by: State
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Discussion

  • Conservative cities are smaller in functional breadth

    • This is largely driven by fewer functions provided
    • Approximately 0.85 to 1.25 fewer functions provided

  • Elected mayors eliminate or reduce this effect, suggesting electoral incentives to “do something” may reduce responsiveness

Next steps

  • Explore additional institutional factors that could limit responsiveness

    • Partisan council elections, districting, referendum requirements, etc.

  • Look at only commonly provided services to eliminate the possibility of small or uncommon services driving the results

References

Tausanovitch, Chris, and Christopher Warshaw. 2014. “Representation in Municipal Government.” American Political Science Review 108 (3): 605–41.

Appendix

Data

Variable Source Year
Functional breadth Census of Governments 2012
Policy conservatism Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014) Various
Population ACS 2006-2010
Median household income ACS 2006-2010
Median house price ACS 2006-2010
100 - percent white ACS 2006-2010
Municipal age Various —

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Appendix

Per Capita Expenditures Per Capita Revenues Sales Tax Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Policy conservatism -1551.857*** -743.701*** -1683.373*** -863.502*** 0.038*** 0.035*
(206.575) (206.199) (229.793) (238.198) (0.011) (0.015)
Population (1000s) 0.789*** 0.859*** 0.000
(0.128) (0.140) (0.000)
Median household income -0.011** -0.011** 0.000*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.000)
Median house price 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
100 - percent white -1.494 -1.934 0.000
(3.357) (3.616) (0.000)
Municipality age 10.079*** 9.729*** 0.000*
(1.727) (1.809) (0.000)
Municipality age squared -0.017** -0.016** 0.000*
(0.005) (0.006) (0.000)
N 1241 1232 1241 1232 1241 1232
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by: State by: State by: State by: State by: State by: State
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

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