What effect did the preclearance process of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (1975) have on special districts?

Motivation

  • The growth in special districts has been extensive over the latter half of the 20th century

    • Growth is uneven across states; some states are high users (e.g., Illinois, New York), and some are lower (e.g., Louisiana, Rhode Island)
  • Creation of such districts is common

Motivations

  • Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires local areas wanting to make local governance changes to acquire “preclearance” from the Department of Justice

52 FR 490, Jan. 6, 1987

§51.13 (e) Any change in the constituency of an official or the boundaries of a voting unit (e.g., through redistricting, annexation, deannexation, incorporation, dissolution, merger, reapportionment, changing to at-large elections from district elections, or changing to district elections from at-large elections).

  • This preclearance process covers special districts (political subdivisions) in all the same ways outlined above.

    • Ex: Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder (asking to be “bailed out” of preclearance requirements)

Section 5 coverage

Expectations

  • In counties covered by Section 5, there exists higher barriers to creating new special districts and dissolving older ones

  • Therefore,

    • We should expect the pre-VRA 1975 period to exhibit differences

    • If the intervention is “successful”, these differences disappear post intervention (no statistical difference between treated and untreated)

  • The 1975 version is preferred because coverage is based on data rather than geographical targeting

Empirical Model

  • Time period: 1942-2007
  • Sample: All counties subject to the 1975 VRA who were not subject to previous VRA iterations (2,518)
  • Treatment: 279 counties in 6 states

Model Specification

\[ y_{ct} = \delta_c + \delta_{st} + \sum_{\tau \ne 1972}\beta_{\tau} I_{\tau t}\times PC_{c} + \varepsilon_{ct} \]

  • where,
    • \(y_{ct}\) is the count of special districts in county \(c\) in time \(t\)
    • \(\delta_c\) is county fixed effect, \(\delta_{st}\) is state-year fixed effect
    • \(\beta_{\tau}\), the variable of interest, is the interaction between year dummies (\(I_{\tau t}\)) and the treatment (\(PC_c\))
    • \(\varepsilon\) is the usual composite error term
  • This specification follows Ang (2019)

County Characteristics, 1970

Treated Untreated
Avg. Std.Dev. Avg. Std.Dev.
Population 46373.10 155891.7 71480.75 252184.0
Percent Black 0.08 0.1 0.04 0.1
Average income 2129.79 519.7 2276.61 469.6

Conclusions

  • Prior to the imposition of the VRA of 1975, pre-treated group have fewer special districts on average
    • The post 1975 period elevates treated county’s usage of special districts such that they are no different than untreated counties
  • Next steps
    • Incorporate the 1965 and 1970 VRAs as a robustness check; requires a different method because of differential timing.

Thank you

References

Ang, Desmond. 2019. “Do 40-Year-Old Facts Still Matter? Long-Run Effects of Federal Oversight Under the Voting Rights Act.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 11 (3): 1–53. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20170572.